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STRATEGIES FOR DEALING WITH DRIFT DURING 
IMPLEMENTATION OF ERP SYTEMS 
 
Paul C. van Fenema (pfenema@rsm.nl) 
Peter J. van Baalen (pbaalen@rsm.nl) 
 
Abstract 
Research on the relationship between Information Technology (IT) and organizations 
emphasizes the complexity of adaptation processes and the potential of drifting. Drifting 
means that an organization encounters unexpected circumstances that show the 
incompleteness and possible failure of an initial technological design without organizations 
having yet feasible alternatives. This conceptual and empirical paper investigates the origins 
and nature of drifting, and strategies for dealing with drift. Three strategies have been 
proposed to deal with drifting: control, incremental, and drift containment. We explore the 
third option that seems most realistic and relevant from an organizational point of view. 
We empirically investigated how drift containment could be accomplished in practice in a 
multi-site ERP implementation project. Our results suggest three phases of dealing with drift. 
Organizations must first recognize when drifting occurs. Next, they must develop a dual 
focus. On one hand, they must differentiate between a project’s overarching objectives 
(which remain relatively stable). On the other hand, they attend to and resolve their 
operational drifting experience. The dual focus thus means that while organizations stay 
focused on their objectives, they address the causes of drifting. During the final phase, 
lessons learnt during drifting resolution must be shared and applied to accelerate 
accomplishment of project objectives. Implications for research and practice are elaborated. 
 
Keywords: IS implementation, strategy, drift 
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BACK TO CONTROL: STRATEGIES FOR DEALING WITH DRIFT 
DURING IMPLEMENTATION OF ERP SYTEMS 
 
Introduction 
 
“The causes (...) on which action depends are never uncontrollable, and any given effect is 
only necessary provided that the causes tending to produce it are not controlled.” 
J.S. Mill (1987, 13) 
 
ERP systems have been frequently criticized for being rigid, massive and consequently hard 
to implement and control. Because of the integrated and ubiquitous nature, ERP requires 
adopters, implementers and users to define a common set of business rules, data standards, 
processes and procedures that span the entire organization (Alvarez et al. 2002, 10). ERP 
systems implementation differ from more traditional information systems implementation in 
terms of scale, complexity, organizational impact, and the costs involved (Grabski et al. 
2003). Consequently, different types of problems may arise due to cross-module integration, 
data standardization, adoption of the underlying business model, compressed implementation 
schedules, and the involvement of a large number of users (Soh et al. 2000). Unsuccessful 
implementation may lead to decreases in profits, increase in inventories, budget overruns, 
high costs of ownership, and disappointing performances (Markus et al. 2003: 205; Motwani 
et al. 2002: 83). These problems will become even worse when ERP-systems are 
implemented multi-site and across national cultures (Soh et al. 2000; Walsham 2002).  
Because of these organizational and cultural complexities, implementation trajectories of 
ERP-systems will often deviate from their planned purpose and may even get out of control. 
ERP implementation then becomes a risky endeavor (Grabski et al. 2003). Ciborra et.al. 
(2001: 4) have called this deviation phenomenon ‘drifting’. Drifting – like a ship that starts 
drifting – means that an organization encounters unexpected circumstances that show 
the incompleteness and possible failure of an initial technological design without 
organizations having yet feasible alternatives. Drifting is a condition of organizations. As 
long as an organization design and set of procedures fit the circumstances, and people 
execute these structures coherently and as intended, organizations operate in a controlled 
manner.  
Because of the high promises (and the large investments that are associated with it) but often 
disappointing performances of ERP systems, extensive research has been accomplished in 
order to ‘discover’ the origins of drifting of these large integrating information systems. This 
research is part of the still growing body on IS failures (Davis et al. 1989; Lyytinen 1987). 
However as Sauer (1999) observes in his historical overview of research on information 
systems failures, little progress has been made during the last three decades. This might be 
due to the domination of the risk control approach in IS implementation. Control – here 
considered in the context of technology implementation – can be viewed as the counter-
concept of drift. Control has been defined as purposive influence toward a 
predetermined goal (Beniger 1986: 39), or as attempts to ensure that individuals 
working on organizational projects act according to an agreed-upon strategy to achieve 
desired objectives (Kirsch 1996). In fact, control activities are aiming at a ‘surprisingless 
future’ in the sense that they try to foresee the consequences of technological change during 
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the implementation process. Control is thus aimed at preventing technologies to drift and to 
reduce the risks associated with drifting. 
However, as recent research suggests, organizations that stick to the traditional risk control 
approach are likely to face the paradox of control (Hanseth et al. 2001; Strong et al. 2003). 
On one hand, the ubiquitous standardization of business processes enhances organizational 
control. On the other hand, control becomes less as the ERP system becomes larger and 
harder to change and adapt (Hanseth et al. 2001; Sia et al. 2002). Scott and Vessye (2003: 
242) believe that failure, at some level, or in some areas of implementation, is inevitable. In 
fact, Schwartz Cowan (1990: 279) concludes “they (i.e., failures) are as inevitable as death 
and taxes”.  
In this paper we deal with the issues of control and drifting during ERP systems 
implementation processes. Literature suggests two dominant approaches to drifting, and one 
emerging strategy. The first approach is a control strategy, aimed at eliminating drifting and 
risk. We will argue and show that drifting is to a certain extent unavoidable. The second 
strategy considers drifting a normal part of technology implementations. ‘Bricolage’ is 
developed as a concept to conceptualize an organization’s ongoing and unique adaptation   of 
technology to its context (Ciborra et al. 2001a). This strategy, however, tends to ignore the 
rigid constraints faced by IS implementation teams, and the expectation that implementers 
will be in control. The third strategy recognizes the inevitable occurrence of drifting in 
technology implementations. Drifting may even contribute to stabilization of projects 
(Holmström et al. 2001).  
This third approach – which we call drift containment strategy – is still recent and lacks 
embedding in the current literature on control and IS failure. An important question is how 
can organizations balance control and drifting, and how drifting can contribute to 
stabilization of implementation project if a large body of literature is aimed at the opposite – 
avoiding drifting.  
The objective of this conceptual and empirical paper is twofold. The first is to gain a 
better insight into the origins and nature of drifting. For this reason we review recent 
research on IS implementation in general and on ERP systems implementation more 
specifically. The second aim is to show how organizations deal with drifting in a 
contained manner in the sense of regaining control instead of letting projects escalate.  
The paper is setup as follows. We review past research on IS implementation failure and 
drifting. Next, we explore specifically drifting as a phenomenon, followed by a review of the 
three strategies to deal with drifting (control, incremental, and drift containment). We then 
present the results of a qualitative study on a multi-site ERP implementation. The paper 
concludes with implications for research and practice. 
 
Studying Drift 
The concept of technology drift has been originally coined by Winner (1977: 88) while 
discussing technological determinism. In his view it should be seen as a state of affairs 
resulting from a multiplicity of technologies “acting and interacting in countless ways beyond 
the anticipations of any person or institution” (Winner, 1977: 89). Due to the increasing speed 
and extent of technological innovation societies face the possibility of “going adrift in a vast 
sea of “unintended consequences”” (Winner 1977: 89). 
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Research into the origins of drifting of information systems and its unintended consequences 
over the last three decades not only has yielded a wide variety of ‘explanations’ for drifting 
but also different theoretical views on technology implementation: factor research, phase 
model research, actor-research, and interaction-context research. We present and critically 
examine each perspective in order to investigate causes of drifting. 
Factor research 
First, to gain insights in the organizational complexity of drifting, many researchers have 
tried to identify individual or a correlate of factors that thwart a smooth implementation 
process. This type of research largely builds on Rogers’ (1995) seminal work on the diffusion 
of innovations in which he has studied many innovations characteristics, adopter 
characteristics, organizational characteristics, and environmental characteristics and their 
relationship with implementation and performance (Bradford et al. 2003: 207). Other 
researchers have extended the number of independent variables to explain the failure or 
success of implementation of ERP systems (Esteves-Sousa et al. 2001; Motwani et al. 2002). 
Holland and Light (2003) have built a critical success factor framework in which they 
distinguish between strategic and tactical factors. With ERP implementations, the authors 
argue, additional factors must be taken into account compared to standard project 
management critical success indicators.  
In spite of its popularity among researchers, diffusion factor research shows some serious 
weaknesses. First, most factors that have been identified in this type of research are not 
technology-specific but apply more or less to most implementation processes. For example, 
saying that top management support is thought to be a vital success factor is not very 
informative about the specific actions undertaken and roles top management has played in a 
particular implementation process. Hence, there may be consensus among researchers about 
the influence of different diffusion factors at a generic and abstract level, yet it appears hard 
to find a consistent set of variables that can explain and predict implementation success or 
failure for different kinds of technologies and different types of organizations at a more 
concrete level (Borton et al. 1993). Moreover, identification of diffusion success factors may 
erroneously lead to the believe that managers have full control over these factors (i.e. they 
can change them at will), and that these factor are causally linked with a successful project 
outcome. 
Phase model research 
Second, in normative ERP implementation research, implementation is described as a linear 
process, split up into different phases. This makes the new technology gradually acceptable to 
the organization and manageable to those who are responsible for the implementation 
process. Each phase is characterized by its own managerial and organizational problems and 
therefore successive steps need to be taken in order to overcome these problems. When these 
problems have been solved, a new phase can be entered. In the last phase the technology has 
become embedded in the organization.  
In recent years planned phase models of implementation are criticized for ignoring the 
organizational complexity and for enforcing this complexity into a straightjacket of a 
simplified projected future. They aim at standardizing organizational processes and practices 
into a deterministic and patterned logic of predicted change (see for overview of criticism on 
phase models: (van Dissel 1999)). Moreover, this type of research assumes that an ERP 
system is an invariant technology that does not change as it is diffused and put into use. 
Waarts et.al. (2002) criticize the static perception of technology in most innovation research 
as it measures the influence of different factors at a particular point of time (‘one-shot 
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adoption studies’). Their research shows the shifts in diffusion stimulating factors over time. 
While in the first stages of diffusion more strategic factors influenced the diffusion of ERP 
systems, in later phases emphasis was put on practical implementation issues (Waarts et al. 
2002). Normative models make it hard to view successes and failures other than through 
normative lenses (Jones 1999). 
Actor Research 
The third stream of research emphasizes the critical role human actors play in the 
implementation process. We discuss in this category the Technology Acceptance Model 
(TAM), resistance perspectives, and technological frames. 
TAM was originally developed by Davis (1989a, 1989b) and conceptualizes the motivation 
and behavior of the end-user of an information system. In the chain of decisions that are 
made in the adoption and implementation processes, end-users decide whether they use new 
technology or not. TAM assumes a rational actor considering using or refusing to use the new 
technology on the basis of two crucial criteria: perceived usefulness (PU) and perceived ease-
of-use (PEOU) (Davis 1989; Davis et al. 1989). Actual choices on the use or refusal to use 
particular technologies may differ from intended use (e.g. the one who decides on the 
purchase of the technology) and may therefore result in drifting technology. The TAM 
provides a useful diagnosis tool as an ‘early warning’ technique to predict whether a new 
system will be acceptable to users and to take corrective action to increase acceptability 
(Davis et al. 1989).  
An important weakness of user acceptance research is that control and drifting of 
technologies are exclusively explained by the individual choices while disregarding the social 
context in which the individual is participating. It implies that TAM can be a powerful 
approach to explain differences in technology acceptance at the individual level, but fails to 
give insights in the choices and acceptance at the collective level. In response, Schwartz 
Cowan (1990) emphasizes that attention should not solely be paid to the individual 
consumer/end-user of the technology, but argues that consumers are embedded in a social 
network of relations that limits and controls the technological choices that people are making 
(Schwartz Cowan 1990).  
 
Instead of TAM’s focus on user-acceptance, other actor research scholars pay attention to the 
resistance of potential or thought-users to new technologies. Following Bauer (1995: 14), 
resistance can be defined as activity that is unexpected in both content and form by 
innovators. As organizations develop routines around the use of new technologies (which 
give rise to a self-enforcing cycle of stability), these routines may become sources of 
resistance (Edmondson et al. 2001). Resistance can be viewed as a form of risky behavior as 
it violates existing rules, norms and predicted goals and achievements. Because of this 
unexpectedness and risk that are involved, implementation of new technology becomes a 
risky activity. In contrast to technology acceptance (TAM), for which there is a clear point in 
time at which a person rationally (cost-benefit) decides to accept (use) a particular 
technology, it appears hard to find a similar ‘concrete’ decision on resistance. Resistance 
contains a range of actions with on a continuum of accepting-resisting the new technology 
(Miles and Thomas, 1995). Accordingly, resistance varies in intensity, from active to passive 
and from individual to collective. Miles and Thomas (1995) argue that in the case of IT the 
intensity of resistance is, compared to other new technologies, low and mainly local, 
informal, individual, and passive. In many instances it is not the technology that is resisted 
but the perceived consequences of implementing a new technology. In the case of IT these 
 6
objects of resistance may be control and misuse of information, loss in the quality of working 
life, de-skilling, changing job structures or the poor quality of interfaces. 
 
While Schwartz Cowan (1990) stresses the importance of a conforming influence from the 
social network on technology choices, other researchers have put emphasis on technology as 
an outcome of diverging and competing technological frames (Orlikowski et al. 1994). Here 
the argument is that multiple social groups may understand and interpret technology in 
different ways (interpretative flexibility) and therefore make different choices if and how they 
may use the technology. Technological frames are defined as a core set of assumptions, 
expectations, and knowledge of technology collectively held by a group or a community 
(Orlikowski et al. 1994). Technological frames not only include the role of technologies 
itself, but also the specific conditions, applications, and consequences of that technology in a 
particular context. In their detailed case study on the implementation of a groupware system. 
Orlikowski and Gash (1994) found incongruence between the technological frames of 
technologists and users, leading to incompatible actions around the technology which made 
the implementation of the system more complicated than expected.  
The strength of the technological framework theory is that it provides an adequate heuristic 
framework for analyzing conflicting perceptions of different social groups and consequently 
for observing the hard and complicated trajectories of technology implementation. However, 
as the authors argue, it should be complemented to include institutional analyses of structural, 
cultural, and political issues. Important questions remain unanswered, such as how and why 
do technological frames emerge in organizations, how they gain legitimacy in organizations, 
how technological frames change over time, and why some particular technological frames 
gain power over other frames. By leaving out technology these social constructivist analyses 
may lead to the rather naïve conclusion that one can reap the direct and intended (enabling) 
effects at will while selectively leave indirect and unintended (constraining) effects aside. 
Interaction-context Research 
Finally, two alternative implementation research approaches have been developed recently: 
structuration theory research and Actor Network Theory. 
In structuration models of technology, explicit attention is given to the interaction between 
technology, human agents and institutional properties of an organization. The basic premise 
here is Giddens’ (1986) concept of the duality of structure, in which the structural properties 
of social systems are conceived both medium and outcome of the practices they recursively 
organize (Giddens, 1986: 25). Giddens provides a theoretical solution to overcome the 
dualism between objective, structural characteristics of organizations on one hand, and 
subjective, knowledgeable actions of human agents on the other hand (Orlikowski 1992). The 
main contribution of IS research from a structuration theory perspective was the insights it 
yielded in the complicated nature of the interaction between human agents, technology and 
organizational properties. Also, the theory showed that appropriations during the 
implementation process make it hard to completely control the development and use of 
information systems. This perspective changed our view on technology as a fixed artifact 
towards something that has emerging properties and which may give rise to unintended 
consequences when it is used in a particular organizational context (i.e. drifting). Moreover, 
structuration theory explicitly points not only to the enabling and but also the constraining 
implications of use of information systems (Orlikowski et al. 1991). 
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Although structuration theory provides interesting insights into the origins of drifting, there 
are still some important issues to address. The most important point is probably the fact that 
structuration theory does not have a clear theoretical and conceptual view on the hard 
(material) part of technology. The question then is: To what extend is this hard part of 
technology open to multiple interpretations? As Jones (1999: 127) argues, some material 
properties of information technology such as power supplies, screen resolution, processing 
speed may be only indirectly interpretatively flexible. Hanseth and Monteiro (1998: 96) argue 
that it remains unclear how specific elements and functions of information systems relate to 
organizational issues. They alternatively suggest applying Actor Network Theory for 
studying the development of information systems in organization.  
The main idea underlying Actor Network Theory (ANT) is that all linked and influencing 
elements, both technical and non-technical, should be included when studying the 
development of information systems in organizations. According to ANT researchers there is 
no legitimate reason why elements (actors) should be excluded that influence the course of 
action. This implies that technology is also viewed as actor in the network. Two basic 
concepts are used to describe and analyze the evolution of the relationships between the 
constituencies of heterogeneous networks: inscription and translation.  
• Inscription refers to the way technical artifacts embody patterns of use, and is used to 
describe how anticipation and restriction of future patterns of use are used in the 
development of technology (Monteiro 2001). By inscribing programs of actions into a 
piece of technology, the technology becomes an actor, which imposes its inscribed 
program of action on its users (Hanseth and Monteiro, 1998: 98). Inscriptions may vary in 
strength. Strong inscriptions leave little room for interpretative flexibility (i.e. unintended 
consequences), which means that using the technology in an alternative way is 
accompanied with high costs.  
• Translation then refers to the process in which actors re-interpret, re-present, and 
appropriate each other’s interest to their own. Translation also refers to the process in 
which the meaning of the technology is negotiated with the specific needs of the context. 
By this process of translation the technology becomes embedded and routinized into the 
context of use. This process thus produces stability and social order.  
The strength of ANT theory is that is allows for detailed analyses of the evolution of the 
complete set of elements related to technology development in organizations. The strength of 
ANT, compared to structuration theory, is that it attempts to conceptualize the role of 
technology more explicitly. Moreover, while structuration theory was not explicitly 
developed for analyzing the role of technology in society, ANT equips us with interesting 
concepts to do this. The weakness of this approach is probably that the number of 
constituencies of the network may be endless and that there are no criteria to determine what 
and who should be included. Another weakness is that its conceptualization of technology as 
an ‘actor’ in a network is somewhat confusing and somewhat misleading. At least the 
differences between the different actors in heterogeneous networks should be nuanced. 
Understanding Drift 
Our discussion on the different strands of research on technology implementation 
demonstrates that our understanding of the causes of drift is still incomplete. In his well-
known study “Beyond Mechanization” Hirschhorn (1984) states that machine systems 
inevitably fail “given the realities of materials and human behavior. Once we accept failure as 
a part of technological reality, we will gain a clearer perspective on postindustrial work” 
(Hirschhorn 1984). This implies that uncertainty, unpredictability, and uncontrollability are 
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inherently accompanied with complex technology implementation as it, in most cases, 
produces more consequences than was intended (Winner, 1977). 
For our understanding of drift we take a few notions of the theories discussed above.  
First, implementation can be defined as the incorporation or routine use of a new technology 
on an ongoing basis in an organization (Edmonson et.al, 2001: 686). The success of 
implementation depends on the extent to which the new technology disrupts the current 
routines in the organization, and the duration of this process. Organizational routines refer to 
‘the repeated pattern of behavior bound by rules and customs that characterize much of an 
organization’s ongoing activity’ (Edmondson et al. 2001). They should not be seen as 
unchangeable and mindless organizational structures but as ‘effortful, emergent 
accomplishments’ of people who think and care (Feldman 2000). Like in structuration theory, 
routines, on one hand, embody the abstract idea of structure, while on the other hand, they 
consist of agency (actual performance) (Feldman et al. 2003). Organizational routines are 
based on organizational-specific knowledge which is to a large extent tacit and collective. 
Second, technology is abstracted, disembedded knowledge that is to some extent emptied 
from its space-time bounded meaning. At the same time technology is embodied and 
inscribed knowledge, which implies that it has material substance and a preferred use. 
Disruption occurs when conflicts arise between the different images of knowledge and work 
practices, caused by time-space discontinuity of the new technology and organizational 
routines. Orlikowski (1992: 407) argues that this time-space discontinuity is caused by the 
fact that actions that constitute (we suggest in the ANT tradition to use the word inscribe) the 
technology (e.g. vendor organizations) are often separated from the actions in which the 
technology is applied (user organization). She distinguishes between the design mode and the 
use mode. In the former human agents build into technology certain interpretative schemes, 
facilities, and norms. In the latter they appropriate technology by assigning shared meaning to 
it, which in turn influences their appropriation of interpretive schemes, facilities and norms 
(Orlikowski 1992). This distinction between design mode and use is not just an analytical 
convenience as Orlikowski (1992) argues, but the two modes, although they may interact 
intensively, are real as they refer to different knowledge practices and contexts. It implies that 
there exists an epistemological gap between design and use contexts which cannot be fully 
bridged. 
Third, following ANT premises, we cannot claim that technology is meaningless unless it is 
instantiated, as it represents inscribed behavior of particular actors in the network. Each new 
technology is inscribed with a preferred use and evokes a certain response, varying from 
resistance, non-usage, deviated usage, to compliance with preferred usage.  
Finally, the extent to which the adoption of new technologies disrupts organizational routines 
and will cause drift depends on the time-space discontinuity. The more actors are involved in 
the same time-space bounded actor network, the greater the chance, by means of translation, 
that interpretative commonality will arise on the meaning and use of the new technology 
(Hanseth et al. Forthcoming). Or reversely, when spatial and temporal distance between 
different actors in the network increases, interpretative flexibility (unintended consequences) 
and drifting will increase as well. 
Dealing with Drift 
One important notion in studying drift is that the unintended consequences should always be 
linked to the intended consequences. Or as Giddens (1986) puts it, unintended consequences 
should always be interpreted “within the flow of intentional conduct” (1986: 285). Drifting is 
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not an invariable and independent outcome of the adoption and implementation of new 
technologies, but primarily a gap between the intended and unintended consequences. It also 
means that drifting should not be conceived as a technology becoming autonomous, 
following its inscribed, internal logic. It implies that research on implementation should not 
only focus on controlling and reducing risks (unintended consequences) but also on different 
strategies for dealing with drift (intended consequences). 
 
Based on recent literature we distinguish three different (ideal) types of implementation 
strategies: control strategy, incremental strategy, and drift containment strategy.1 By 
implementation strategy we mean the planned and intended course of actions taken to 
implement a particular technology. We present the three types of strategy and analyze them 
guided by the following organizational processes commonly distinguished in IS 
implementation literature: communication, learning, and knowledge management. 
 
• Communication is conceived to be a crucial activity for the adoption and implementation 
of information systems. Rogers (1995: 17) defines communication as the process by 
which participants create and share information with another in order to reach a mutual 
understanding. Through communication potential users are influenced about the relative 
advantages of new technology and are persuaded to adopt it (Attewell 1992). As a rule, 
the better the mutual understanding, the greater the chance for acceptance and the faster 
the rate of diffusion of the innovation. Communication activities may differ to the extent 
that they are aimed at enhancing or delimiting alternative solutions. 
• Organizational learning. The role of individual and organizational learning in 
implementation processes of new technologies have been emphasized frequently by 
researchers of innovations. Individual learning refers to the distillation of the experiences 
of an individual regarding a technology, whereas organizational learning refers to the 
acquiring of individual insights and skills that have become embodied in organizational 
routines, practices, and beliefs that outlast the presence of the originating individual 
(Attewell, 1992: 6). As Attewell argues, there is no direct correspondence between these 
organizational routines and the individual’s understanding of the new technology. More 
over the link between learning and experience is often lost to the organization. This 
implies that the individual learning experience that gave rise to a particular organizational 
routine may be lost, while ‘lessons’ remains instantiated in the organizational routine.  
In the case of implementing complex technologies which are multifaceted and with 
interactions and interdependencies with other elements of the organization, it will become 
impossible for the designer to know in advance how the technology will perform when it 
is put into use. For this reason it makes sense within an implementation strategy to 
differentiate between programmed learning and adaptive learning. In programmed 
learning an ex ante transfer of knowledge is intended from the originator to the user, who 
is expected to learn about the new technology to apply it in a particular way.  Abstracted 
knowledge is acquired in the learning context that is separated from the context of 
application (Gibbons et al. 1994). In adaptive learning takes place in the physical and 
social context in which the technology is employed (Tyre et al. 1997). The learning 
                                                 
1 Inspiration for this distinction between three types of implementation strategies comes from Sauer’s (1999) 
three ways of approaching IS development and implementation: risk control, risk containment, and 
incrementalism. 
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emphasizes discovery through enactment and interpretation and leaves room for variation 
in finding to context-specific solution (Gunther McGrath 2001). Knowledge and skills 
about the technology use are acquired by learning by using and are rooted in experience 
(Rosenberg 1982). 
• Knowledge management. An important weakness of most organizational learning 
approaches is that they fail to address the ‘management’ of knowledge that is learned in 
organizational processes (Nonaka 1994). In the case of implementation strategies this 
means that new knowledge that is acquired is not consciousness collected, stored, and 
distributed in the organization. In other words, each participant has to re-invent the wheel. 
Cultivating the organizational memory on implementation issues might help the involved 
actors in the network to take advantage of the new insights that have been gained at a 
particular time and place. 
 
We now present and analyze the three IS implementation strategies: control strategy, 
incremental strategy, and drift containment strategy. Table 1 summarizes our findings. 
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Table 1 Comparing the three strategies for dealing with drift 
 
 Communication Organizational learning Knowledge Management 
 
Control strategy 
Communication activities 
aiming at getting the same 
(‘best’) way to conduct the 
project. 
Oriented to programmed 
learning to prevent people 
deviating from the project 
planning. 
Up-front collecting of 
information in order to 
inform people before the 
project starts. 
 
Incremental 
strategy 
Interactive communication 
activities aimed at finding 
solutions to local problems. 
Oriented to adaptive 
learning to solve local 
problems. 
Oriented toward knowledge 
creation and 
sharing for application in 
the immediate 
implementation practice. 
 
Drift containment 
strategy 
Interactive communication 
activities aimed at finding 
solutions to local problems 
and to connect to strategic 
intentions. 
Oriented to adaptive 
learning to solve local 
Problems, while at the 
same time reflection on 
local implementation 
practice. 
Oriented toward knowledge 
creation and sharing for 
application in the 
immediate implementation 
practice. Creating new 
knowledge during the 
implementation process 
that might be useful in new 
projects. 
 
Control strategy 
The first strategy assumes that risks of drifting can and should be avoided by those 
responsible for the implementation at the center of authority. They can accomplish this by 
formulating their intentions as precisely as possible and then strive for their implementation 
with a minimum of distortion (definition adapted from (De Wit et al. 1994)). Organizations 
structure their activities and assume that when people execute these structures faithfully drift 
will be avoided (Snook 2000). This approach is characterized by words like roll out, structure 
driven organizing, one size fits all, lists of factors/ causes, extensive training, excluding 
surprises, reducing the unknown, and creating an overseeable world. To this end measures 
are introduced like methods, planning, and homogeneous discourse (Räisänen et al. 2004).  
Organizations tend to define clear targets, objectives, and comprehensive planning. This is 
implemented through extensive knowledge sharing and training that attempts to foresee any 
possible obstacle. A concern with this approach is that sometimes the underlying causes of 
drifting are ignored. People tend to quasi simplify situations which is unrealistic. However, 
striving for a perfect implementation is neither impossible nor feasible, people can’t foresee 
everything. Organizations must learn to adjust their structures, they must bend slightly to 
real-life circumstances in order to avoid coming sooner or later to an undesirable stop 
(Holmström et al. 2001; Keil 1995).  
Knowledge management initiatives aim at collecting more detailed information about user-
needs, organizational and environmental specifics. Collecting detailed information about the 
requirements only makes sense if the contextual conditions under which the implementation 
takes place are stable and do not create new information needs. To prevent these conditions 
become unstable, formal and informal controls are instituted to ensure pursuit of the intended 
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consequences. In most cases this implies that rules for implementation are imposed on actors 
that are involved in the process by, for example, restricting the options open to them (limiting 
access to applications and/or information, excluding potential users). Communication is 
directed towards the establishing of a common understanding of the preferred use of the new 
technology. Learning takes place ex ante, ‘off stage’, and aims at limiting the range of 
alternative solutions. No knowledge management initiatives are taken during the 
implementation process as it is assumed that the information that is needed is already 
available (and transferred in the ex ante training programs). 
Incremental strategy 
The underlying assumption of the second incremental strategy is that the course of the 
implementation process cannot be fully predicted and controlled. The mood of this approach 
is captured – maybe with some exaggeration – in words like go with the flow, learning, 
letting things happen and we have to live with it. Technology and agency must mutually 
adapt, the sources and nature of this process seem intricate. In this view drifting and 
unanticipated events are accepted as unavoidable and unpredictable. Instead of enhancing 
control it is argued that adaptive capabilities are required from the part of the actors. One of 
such crucial organizational capabilities is improvisation. This organization mode is conceived 
to be the key success factor that can hold together a faltering organization (Ciborra 1999). 
Improvisation is a highly situated activity. Another organizational capability mentioned in 
Ciborra’s work is bricolage, which refers to the tinkering through combination of resources at 
hand. In bricolage the practices and situations disclose new uses and application of 
technology (Ciborra 2002). In this spirit, hacking is a technical capability aimed at devising 
and implementing a technology in an original and unorthodox way. 
The power of these three incremental tactics (improvisation, bricolage, hacking) is that these 
activities are highly situated and try to exploit the local context and resources at hand. In 
contrast to control strategies, incremental strategies refrain from limiting interpretative 
flexibility and open up for alternatives by stimulating serendipity and open experimentation 
to accommodate to the idiosyncratic implementation context. Communication and 
organizational learning initiatives are not taken ex ante but in situ. Solutions are created and 
communicated as problems appear. Knowledge management initiatives aim at collecting and 
sharing knowledge and to be applied in the immediate context.  
Incremental implementation strategies, in particular the radical versions, are open-ended; they 
progress (or regress) without a purpose and without a timeframe. Improvisation, bricolage, 
and hacking may be useful to solve practical problems and allow for changing organizational 
routines but might give way to endless and purposeless reinvention of information systems. 
The problem with this incremental approach is that unintended consequences become 
disconnected from the intended consequences or that no attempt is made to establish dialogue 
between the two. The result might be that the organization finds a mode to institutionalize the 
new technology but fails to accomplish that within the organization’s resource constraints 
(budget, time). 
Drift containment strategy 
In the third drift containment strategy, drifting is time-space bound within a wider framework 
of intended consequences. This strategy builds on the assumption that drift can play a 
necessary role to accommodate to the idiosyncratic context and multiple interests of those 
who are involved in the implementation process (Holmström et al. 2001). While the 
organizational processes are quite similar to those of the incremental strategy, they are tied to 
a control strategy framework. Drift containment pays particular attention to transition 
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activities (communication, learning and knowledge management) that connects control and 
incremental strategies. Within the drift containment strategy, control and incremental 
implementation are defined at different operating levels. It means that direct control is not 
necessarily exercised at the level of the implementation practice but at the higher level of 
intended consequences.  
Like in the incremental strategy, communication and learning are not directed to achieve a 
common understanding of the initial, preferred use of the technology, but to learn the context-
specific problems and to find solutions. However, the most important difference compared 
with the incremental strategy is that they also allow for reflexive monitoring of the 
implementing activities (Giddens, 1986: 5). It is through this reflexive monitoring that those 
who are involved in the implementation process connect to the intended consequences that 
are defined at a higher level. This keeps people in touch with the wider strategic context in 
which the goals are settled. We consider knowledge management potentially the most 
important reflexive monitoring activity as it tries to capture and reformulate the knowledge 
that has been created during the implementation process. 
Whereas control and incremental strategies are primarily one-directional, aiming at the 
institutionalization of the new technology into the organization, the drift containment strategy 
is inherently dialectical through a continuing dialogue between high-order organizational 
goals and local implementation practice. It does not mean that the intended consequences will 
remain completely the same, yet they provide a basic beacon of stability during potentially 
complex implementation experiences. In reflexive monitoring implementing practices are 
constantly examined in reformed in the light of new incoming information and therefore may 
constitutively alter the original intentions (Giddens 1991).  
What remains unclear, however, is how drift containment could be accomplished in practice. 
Specific questions include: what phases do organizations go through, how do they combine 
control and improvisational aspects of drifting, and how can organizations regain control. We 
empirically investigated these questions in a multi site ERP implementation project that 
drifted on a few occasions. After elaborating on the methods of our study, we present and 
analyze the findings. 
Methods 
Motivation and design 
Drifting is an uncommon phenomenon in research. In fact, only a few studies exist that refer 
to it. The exploratory nature of our empirical research question – how do organizations 
contain drifting – encouraged us to adopt a qualitative research approach (Yin 1994). We 
selected the case study methodology as a form of qualitative research to focus in depth on a 
specific instance of IS project drifting (Myers 2001/ 2003). Researchers are commonly 
advised to consider the case study method when they are studying contemporary phenomena.  
The reason for selecting the DiskCo case was the likelihood that drifting would occur. 
Drifting as a phenomenon is based on our earlier mentioned definition of the concept. We 
were looking for an IS context where drifting is likely, and turned our focus towards 
packaged software implementations. This became a natural choice given the abundance of 
recent literature on the complexity and difficulty of these projects (Davenport 1998; Soh et al. 
2000). We further narrowed down to multi-site projects as this increases the chance of 
implementation challenges and drifting (Markus et al. 2000).  
The in-depth character of our design implied a limitation in terms of the number of case 
studies. We chose a single case study approach to leverage the advantage of exploring 
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drifting in a unique setting, rather than contrasting multiple case studies that would have been 
executed in a more superficial manner given the availability of resource. A single case study 
design enables theory building and conceptual generalization (Eisenhardt 1989; Yin 1994).  
The DiskCo case featured an embedded case study design (Yin 1994). This means that in 
addition to our central unit of analysis (the multi-site project under investigation), we paid 
attention to other levels, such as phases, individual perspectives, and intra site phenomena.  
Following Eisenhardt (1989), the case study was not designed as a grounded study. We 
delved deeply into theory on organizational drifting in order to develop a conceptual lens, and 
to answer our research question as completely as possible before embarking on empirical 
work.  
The exploratory nature of our research question implied a semi-structured setup of our data 
collection method as will be explained in the next section.  
Data collection 
The first author conducted interviews using a research protocol and semi-structured interview 
questions, assisted by a graduate student. The protocols provided focus and helped guide the 
research. During the actual data collection some questions were refined. Proceeding insights 
in the case situation enabled more focused questions. Table 2 lists the interviews at DiskCo. 
The interviewees were selected after discussing with a company representative our research 
interests. Multi-site IS implementation projects offer ample opportunities for selecting 
interviewees by site, organizational level, and functional area (IS or business functions). As 
the table shows, we managed to interview people from multiple sites in Singapore and 
Malaysia, multiple levels (executive, director, staff), and multiple functional areas (IS staff 
and key users from non-IS departments). Interviews were conducted face-to-face unless 
people were located outside Singapore HQ (i.e., Singapore site E, Malaysia). In that case we 
arranged for a teleconference.  
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Table 2 Interviews DiskCo Case 
 
Unit & Site Functional Area People & Role2 Number of 
interviews 
CPW, Vice President  3 
HHT, Director Applications Development 3 
OBT, Member Oracle Conversion Team 1 
JPL, Member Oracle Conversion Team 1 
Information 
Technologies 
SCC, Member Oracle Conversion Team 1 
Finance ST, Key user 1 
Singapore site A 
(HQ) 
 
Material & System JLL, Key user 1 
Singapore site E Information 
Technologies 
GP, Member Oracle Conversion Team. 
Temporarily stationed here from Singapore 
site A 
1 
JNL, Project Manager Data Conversion Team 1 Information 
Technologies 
MC, Member Data Conversion Team 1 
Finance SKL, Key user 1 
Malaysia site A 
 
 
Inventory Control ET and some colleagues, Key users 1 
Total number of interviews  16 
 
During interviews, ideas were almost permanently jotted down to capture ideas that popped 
and represent relevant information on the interviewee, the interview content, and the 
interview process. After interviews, results and notes were discussed and reflected upon with 
a graduate student who participated in data collection. This inspired us to re-ask questions for 
clarification, and ask the same question to other people. We gradually refined the focus of the 
research and data collection while staying within the original structure of the study. All notes 
made during interviews were collected and stored; all interviews were transcribed for further 
analysis.  
Data collection encompassed data sources beyond the formal interviews as recommended by 
Yin (1994). During two weeks the first author and graduate student participated as observers 
in the organization when not interviewing. We had numerous informal conversations with 
people involved in the project at different levels of the organization. This included going out 
for lunch and moving around, all aimed at improving awareness of the situation.  
                                                 
2 Names are abbreviated to maintain confidentiality. 
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Other data included corporate documentation (photo copies of documents, and large amounts 
of digital intra organizational files). As a historic trail, these resources give insight in events 
and policies important to the project and therefore the research. 
Data analysis 
Following Yin (1994), we carefully organized data to make it readily accessible for analysis 
by multiple researchers and from multiple angles. Most data was and is centrally accessible in 
digital format.  
As a first step, a case narrative and initial, raw analysis was completed and fed back to 
DiskCo. The comments we received on this first draft were incorporated in the next version. 
This practice enhances construct validity according to Yin (1994), and highlights the 
uniqueness of the setting (Klein et al. 1999).  
We then engaged in an intense period of reading the data and selecting quotes relevant to our 
research objective. While this intellectual search process is challenging to describe, it 
involved practices like creating graphs, time paths (Miles et al. 1994). We constantly worked 
on selecting and analyzing quotes from different angles, and revisiting theory. Ultimately, we 
searched for words that enabled us to select relevant quotes. For drifting, this includes words 
like “expected”, “change”; for a control strategy words like “plans”, “control”; for an 
incremental strategy “adaptation”; and for drift containment words like “back to control”, and 
“stabilize”. At the same time, we remained open to different words and types of sentences 
that could point at the concepts relevant to our study. For instance, the following quote was 
categorized as pointing at a control strategy because the interviewee uses words like 
“structured”, and “method”. 
 
“This methodology helps a lot in the sense that because we had never done 
such an ERP implementation before, not for my self. (…) I think it is quite a 
structured way, a method, and it really fits very well. I think the method is 
really derived in such a way that it is a good fit for any organization who 
wants to do the Oracle ERP implementation.” - HHT, Director Applications 
Development, Singapore site A (DiskCo-B-1)  
 
Quantitative measurement of quotes as used in some qualitative studies (Edmondson et al. 
2001) was considered but not adopted since we did not benchmark the study against 
alternative cases, nor did we conduct a detailed chronological study.  
Authors’ selection and interpretation of data was independently completed and cross-checked 
to promote internal validity (Yin 1994). Contrasting experiences and interpretations were 
brought up in discussions between the authors, and sometimes involving other researchers. 
This meets the multiple interpretations principle suggested by Klein and Myers (1999). 
Eventually, the analysis process stabilized towards the current final interpretation as 
presented in the findings and discussion section.   
Description of the case study 
DiskCo is the focal organization of this study. The multinational company is headquartered in 
the US. Manufacturing plants are located in China, Malaysia, and Thailand. The Far East 
headquarter is in Singapore where many products are also assembled. The company offers 
solutions for data storage and processing to individuals and business. DiskCo’s activities 
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include two main categories: physical products (disc and tape drives), and software. We focus 
on the former category that is organized around disc drive and media operations. The 
company relies on tightly integrated vertical supply chains that start at production facilities in 
the US, Europe and Asia for large volumes. Distribution and sales is organized around a 
global network of DiskCo sites and partner organizations. R&D is located in Singapore, and a 
couple of sites in the US. Our study focuses on the multi-site implementation in the Far East, 
because our primary access point for data collection was there. 
DiskCo started in 1994 a strategic project to encounter the year 2000 problem. The firm 
decided in 1995 to implement an ERP system across its global sites, and started with sites in 
the US. Far East and European sites commenced in 1996 and completed the project in 1999.  
The initial master schedule dictated a tight sequence of implementations based on the fixed 
end date: the Y2K problem. In reality, implementations had to be delayed to cater for 
learning effects and site specific needs. The final site - Japan - was ready just in time by June 
1999. The Y2K problem would already start to have an impact form July 1999 onwards.  
Singapore HQ therefore took the responsibility for Far East implementations with the 
exception of Thailand. They were assisted by the US, resulting in a mixed strategy on a 
global level. DiskCo adopted a “core team” approach. This group consists of IT specialists 
and key users (user representatives). Their membership of the same team promotes cross-
functional collaboration. Key users liaise between the core team and users in their functional 
area. They also maintain contact with (key) users at other sites. For instance, (key) users in 
Finance. From outside DiskCo, Oracle consultants and trainers were involved. In Singapore 
and Malaysia, they trained local IT staff and key users. DiskCo adopted Oracle’s Application 
Implementation Method (AIM), and later the Software Development Life Cycle (SDLC).  
The master plan is elaborated on a regional and functional level. The regional fine-tuning for 
each site is done by project executives and directors. At the same time, functional 
communities - like Finance, Engineering - coordinate implementation of modules on a global 
level. The plan is a living document: when sites cannot meet the schedule, they will contact 
local managers, who will escalate requests for a delay to regional executives. These people 
will contact the DiskCo CIO in the US to consider adjustments.  
Case Study Findings 
The pressure to perform: an organization compelled to avoid drifting 
DiskCo’s worldwide implementation of the Oracle ERP system commenced in the US in 
1997. The company struggled with the new technology that had to be mapped against current 
practices. At this time, representatives from European and Asian sites were involved. 
DiskCo’s Singapore site would become the coordination center for the Far East region. 
Executives from that site participated therefore in meetings on the implementation project. 
On an operational level, there were some contacts to promote knowledge absorption from US 
experiences. The Vice president IT of Singapore IT stressed the importance of his people 
going through the conversion experience at US sites: 
“When the US started their conversion we sent people from here to there to 
kind of go through their conversion process. We also sent people from the 
data conversion team to work with the data conversion team and the 
programmer there for them to explain to us everything about the program 
and we do everything hands-on there. We go through their live conversion 
for one of the plants to observe how they do the conversion and what kind of 
problems they encounter. So that is what we refer to when we talk about the 
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transfer of knowledge. Before we do anything we send people there to learn 
from them. There are Operations people sent there for 2 weeks to sit with 
their Operations people, and of course the US sites also established some 
standards, like how the configuration should look like, this is the hardware 
that we want, this is how we gonna organize the files, the databases and 
things like that. These are some standards that we will follow. The program 
changes that we need to follow are also sent. This is one part of the transfer 
of knowledge: go there, work with them, know, learn from them.” - CPW, 
DiskCo-A-3 
Acquiring knowledge from US sites was an example of drift avoidance. The Singaporeans 
were eager to learn and share available expertise to reduce surprises and possible drift during 
their own project. The company’s schedule was aggressive and had a firm deadline. By June 
1999 all systems had to be replaced in order to avoid the risk that corporate systems would 
stop to function when dealing with year 2000 data (due to the financial year at DiskCo, this 
would start already in June).  
When the conversions commenced in Singapore, people from the US would come over to 
conduct training and help out. Throughout the project, Singaporeans and Malaysians would 
call upon their US counterparts for assistance. While the main resources for the 
implementation were concentrated in Singapore, DiskCo had setup a team for data 
conversion in Malaysia. People from Singapore and Malaysia tapped into DiskCo US 
knowledge bases through personal contact and documentation: 
“The US sites converted earlier than [Singapore site A]. So they have a lot 
of people who are more experienced in Oracle. So I work with the US in the 
sense that if I have any question or issue, or anything that I’m not sure of, I 
will normally ask them. Because when we have the training session, they do 
come over and train us, give us some sort of training. So if we have any 
questions, we are free to ask them.” - JLL, DiskCo-G-1 
In addition to these personal contacts, the company developed a range of standards, 
checklists, and other documentation to assist with the conversion. Methods for implementing 
the software were used to complement the lack of ERP knowledge in Singapore and 
throughout the DiskCo organization: 
“This methodology helps a lot in the sense that because we had never done 
such an ERP implementation before, not for my self. (…) I think it is quite a 
structured way, a method, and it really fits very well. I think the method is 
really derived in such a way that it is a good fit for any organization who 
wants to do the Oracle ERP implementation.” - HHT, Director Applications 
Development, Singapore site A (DiskCo-B-1)  
These efforts show that the company was strongly focused on understanding the unknown in 
advance. It wanted to avoid drifting and failure at all costs. The Vice president IT in 
Singapore expressed the pressure he felt which for him translated in highly active 
involvement in local implementations: 
“You can’t just sit in your office, waiting for something to happen. Because 
the impact is so great, when you turn on and it fails, there is no way to go 
back. And in our conversion, there is no such thing as a parallel run (i.e., 
running simultaneously the old MANMAN system and new Oracle ERP - 
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author). It's cut. So when they cut, you move on from one week, there is no 
way to move back anymore.  
Since the consequences are a lot more serious, I cannot just sit there and 
wait for people to tell me all the good news. I have to be in there to see it. 
And also an important thing is our conversion schedule is so tight. It's all 
24 hours or sometimes 2 days, 2 nights continuously.” - CPW, DiskCo-A-3 
The project organization took on the properties of a collective effort that attempted 
to exclude the possibilities of drift. The expectations for local conversions were 
communicated through a master schedule that spelled out which sites should be 
converted by which date, including intermediate phases:  
“For my role, I have to cover all the plans, make sure that all the plants are 
converted on time and according to the schedule. For example [Malaysia 
site A] - all these people there, my director there they have the master plan. 
They know when it is their turn, and when what they need to do what. We 
have weekly meeting so that we know when they are supposed to send 
somebody for what, and when they need to make sure that all the 
infrastructure is ready. And they also coordinate and work with their local 
key user to organize training. And if they need any help from here to 
conduct the training, that is when we have a meeting or even before the 
meeting they all talk to me very regularly. And then over here (Singapore 
site A - author) I will coordinate the resources to help them.” - CPW, 
DiskCo-A-3  
In combination with DiskCo’s hierarchy, the schedule became a visible expression 
of the organization’s required performance. The organizational structure presented 
people with a de facto set of expectations. Deviations were tolerable nor tolerated 
as these would jeopardize this important project from succeeding. In conjunction, 
project failure or success would strenghten or weaken executives responsible for 
their part of the global ERP project. Careers were on the line: 
“You have to have a command hierarchy. And they all know who makes the 
core, the decision. If you leave it open to anybody to make the core, then 
there is no way that you can really meet that kind of schedule. Because 
everybody wants things their way. Everybody wants their convenient time. 
But we have a kind of structure in such a way that the program is already 
all laid out, the schedule has to be followed. And in the US the big bosses 
are all following the schedule very closely. So there is nobody below who 
can say “Hey I don’t want to do it.” No. So I think hierarchy is very 
important. You have a strong support there and it is very clear that that 
must be done. And it’s a “don’t ask any questions, just get it done” kind of 
thing. And then we will draw all the plans nicely to help you to meet that 
plan. But don’t change the schedule. We are the ones who can change or 
don’t change.” - CPW, DiskCo-A-5 
Operationally, the pressure translated in a tendency to pre-understand and pre-organize local 
implementations. The company struggled to standardize local operations in line with the EPR 
system. Understandably, local practices sometimes differed from the principles underpinning 
the ERP system, sometimes due to public regulations or cultural practices (Soh et al. 2000). 
People knew this and attempted to highlight, understand, and resolve such differences 
upfront:  
 20
“Of course there are here some quite unique requirements that [Malaysia 
site A] needed because of some government regulations. So those are 
already been highlighted quite upfront when they are aware that they need 
to highlight new and unique features; and then similarly that was done for 
China. So I would say that there are quite a number of them that is unique 
because of country requirements” - HHT, DiskCo-B-1 
After the first few conversions in Singapore, other Asian sites followed. As Singaporeans had 
learned from their US counterparts, Asian sites tapped into knowledge accumulated in 
Singapore. This expertise was communicated in person and reified in documents and 
checklists that fine-tuned American know-how for the Asian situation.  
“During the [Singapore site A] conversion we have gone through so many 
bad experiences, and good experiences as well, so we know a lot of things, 
we already know the process very well. So when we come to other sites that 
they want to convert, we can help them. If you gonna do it this way, you will 
face this problem, and what is the correct way that they should take. So it 
shortens a lot of time. Even the conversion table that we set up, they follow 
us closely. Because if you don't do it, then you face a lot of problems. And 
also, we have established a lot of reports so when they convert they can just 
pick up whichever they want. So the time required for them to convert is 
relatively shorter compared to [Singapore site A].” - JLL, DiskCo-G-1 
Throughout the company, people realized the importance of the project. At the start of every 
implementation, the vice president IT from Singapore would travel to local sites to announce 
the project. The involvement of this high ranking person in the Far East organization 
communicated the value of the conversion to DiskCo and it made people listen. When the 
pressure was put on local sites to contribute for their part to the project, people also received 
support on how to travel the conversion path.  
“Every project before the site starts, we have a kick-off meeting with all the 
site management and the key users. I'm the one who goes around and does a 
presentation to them to explain why we need to convert and what are the 
steps to be carried out to do the conversion. And how the site prepares, and 
what are the involvements and what is the schedule. And I'm the one who 
does the communication. And that is the main communication to the 
manager level. For the key user level, I use the IT person at the site to 
communicate with them, prepare them, and go through the schedule: when 
we should bring a PC, upgrade the PC's, when the users should go for 
training, and how plan according to that.” - CPW, DiskCo-A-5 
People from local Asian sites frequently communicated with their counterparts in Singapore 
who constituted a regional knowledge center. There was a risk that people at local sites would 
not understand the software or implementation process. Their geographical distance from the 
Singapore site could lead to a lack of information processing (Allen 1984; Kraut et al. 1990) 
and early detection of drifting. The satellite site conversions could start drifting and thereby 
jeopardize the success of the grand project. DiskCo counteracted this risk of drifting by 
promoting regular visits to local sites. The company was eager to know about unique features 
of local operations which could grow into deviations from the master plan. 
“Sometimes we can talk about one thing, and end up they are doing 
something else, differently. So it's good that periodically you can visit them 
and see what is going over there. (…) Some of the countries the people like 
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China they will follow whatever you say, whatever you have the subsystem 
they will try to accommodate. But the thing is their operation may be 
slightly different. But they didn't feedback to you. So if you go there and 
visit them and you kind of talk to more people, then you get to know more. 
Then you see that that is not the way they operate. It deviates slightly, and 
maybe we have to have some workaround for that. If I'm talking about 
feedback, that is when I go and talk to them during on-site visits. That is the 
feedback that I gather. So that's why I say it's important to me that I visit 
them every 3 months or 6 months.” - JLL, DiskCo-G-1 
Feedback of information from local conversions sustained Singapore’s overview of 
regional progress and confirmed its grip on the project. Regular meetings in person 
or through teleconferences between for instance China and Singapore clarified 
local situations and possible deviations from the master schedule. Early detection 
made small adjustments possible on the move. If local conversions stagnated, 
Singapore would mobilize resources to help out: 
“All of them report back to the same boss (i.e., CPW - author). That is one 
of the key success factors, because you cut down a lot of unnecessary 
coordination. And you lead to one dedicated person to make a lot of 
decisions to make sure that everything is coordinated properly, and to make 
decisions, and to move the resources to fill the gap. Because all of them now 
report to one person, all report back to the same organization. The 
management here can anytime almost randomly move their resources 
depending on which one is more critical, what is the situation now, how we 
coordinate that. I think that is very important. If we did not have the free 
hand to do that, it is very difficult. Because, when the project moves 
forward, always some things happen, something that you never planned, or 
something last minute pops up. Like we are doing some hardware, then this 
factory suddenly ramps up, needs more capacity and things like that. So you 
have to have the overall person who is able to coordinate all this and also 
make decisions, and make this call. So it's like: “OK you down to there, 
drop everything, do this”. And I'm not talking about just the application, I'm 
talking about infrastructure, operation, everything. (…) I think it is 
important that you have one place, one person to make the call.” - CPW, 
DiskCo-A-3 
Knowledge sharing and regular communications thus enabled DiskCo to anticipate 
and respond to small instances of drifting. The company used Lotus Notes 
groupware to track and trace small ‘projects’ that consisted of local requests for 
adjusting the Oracle system. These requests were carefully monitored because they 
undermined the idea of implementing one standard software package for the whole 
corporation. And from a project management point of view, they could delay the 
implementation. Local sites therefore had to enter their request in the groupware 
system so that people in Singapore and possibly even the US could monitor almost 
real time the status and progress.  
“We have a very useful project database where we put in our individual 
enhancement requests. And this is accessible by all plants. From there the 
local IT approves them and they work on it. So for the programmers, the IT 
bosses or whoever has access can just view through that and see whether 
they are working on the right thing. I'm sure they print that status out and 
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review that every week with their own department. But that has to be 
commented by the IT department. But that database really does help.” - ET, 
DiskCo-K-1 
In short, DiskCo Singapore attempted to make the regional ERP implementation a success. 
They invested in knowledge transfer from the US to Singapore and methods for successful 
implementations. They refined that knowledge and passed it on to other regional sites. The 
Singapore site passed on the pressure of project success according to the global master 
schedule to local sites while informing and equipping them for the job they had to 
accomplish. These efforts translated in a very active organization that processed relevant 
signals for project progress aggressively. Small adjustments were made to cater for deviations 
between the planned conversion and actual experience. Despite this strong drive to avoid and 
reduce drifting, the project did start to drift on some occasions. How the company dealt with 
these situations is presented in the next paragraph. 
Sideslips and back to control 
In areas with snow or heavy rain, car drivers know the risk of sideslips. Most people will 
drive very carefully. They concentrate on the surface condition, they monitor other drivers. In 
advance they may prepare extensively by watching weather broadcasts and selecting the least 
risky route, supposed they have to get out. They attempt to avoid skidding by investing in ex 
ante expertise and executing pre-orchestrated moves.  
These practices resemble DiskCo’s focus on and investments in avoiding drift. As practice 
tells, however, sometimes even the best prepared and experienced drivers may experience 
sideslips. DiskCo Singapore, with all its investments in various forms of knowledge 
management, and extensive interpersonal communications practices encountered sideslip 
experiences on more than one occasion. Small deviations were resolved by sending in more 
resources, and working sometimes through the night and evening:  
“When we have a weekly meeting it is a meeting conference call. That 
means all the sites that are involved in the project, we have a weekly 
meeting, conference call and each of the sites will report their status. What 
are the preparations they, are in and individually I will also talk to the 
director of my IT organization over there, to track where they are. What we 
have is, for example this is [Singapore site A], then this is say [Malaysia 
plant A]. We know that from [Singapore site A] to [Malaysia plant A] we 
have 2 months. And we also know exactly which week we are doing the trial 
data load, CRP, the business test, user training etc. We track this very 
closely to make sure that all this is on time. If any of these things slip it is 
potentially affecting other sites.” - CPW, DiskCo-A-3 
Some sideslips could not be resolved by piecemeal adjustments. People would encounter 
challenges that could not be resolved within the context of the original project structure. One 
way of responding is by not accepting the situation and enhancing control, i.e., further 
increasing the pressure on people. This would fit the first approach towards drift. If reality 
doesn’t match the control structure, it should be forced to fit. A driver would not accept his 
experience. Unfortunately, such attempts to counteract reality often lead to out of control 
situations. The car will spin away and most likely come to an unpleasant stop. With IS 
projects, the potential consequence of this idea is escalation, as people are not granted the 
time they need to resolve issues, and increasingly resist the pressure put on them.  
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Another response would be acceptance of drift (the second approach). People would 
acknowledge the inherent difficulty of implementing standardized software in a 
heterogeneous organization. Most organizations cannot accept this approach as too many 
interests are on the line. When managers cannot predict whether and how they will arrive at 
the preset deadline, they lose credibility.  
In our driving example, the third approach would imply that the driver accepts his condition 
of drifting but looks for feasible interventions that will somehow lead him back to control. 
We found evidence that this third approach to drifting works in practice. DiskCo Singapore 
experienced three major drift situations. These can be defined as moments when people 
cannot possibly meet project milestones. The reason is local practice differs substantially 
from what they initially expected. The mismatch with the new system becomes so severe that 
pre-knowledge and plans cannot cater for it. 
In short, DiskCo responded to these major drift situations by (1) pausing the complete 
project, (2) letting people sort out and understand the problem, and (3) accelerating the 
project afterwards fueled by the newly acquired knowledge. Metaphorically, one could 
imagine a driver starting to skid, and responding by taking time to perform counter moves, 
and then once he has regained control, he continues with renewed confidence. 
DiskCo’s Singapore conversion drifted when the project team attempted to let the system 
process the huge volumes of the manufacturing plant there.  
“After [Singapore site A], (...) is supposed to convert another big plant, but 
ever since [Singapore site A] converted, we are having a lot of system issues 
because that is only the time when you see the real volume coming. During 
the test you cannot really do a so-called stress test to the real environment. 
And we have a lot of other things, also because we are in the learning stage 
of the learning curve. A lot of things we don’t understand well, we have to 
take much longer. So after the conversion of Singapore site A we suffer a lot 
- about 3 months before we stabilize.” - CPW, DiskCo-A-3 
DiskCo US had implemented the ERP system in a smaller scale R&D operation. Their 
expertise and checklists were geared to that situation and insufficient for the Asian plants that 
manufactured massive volumes for the world market. Not only did the American practices 
not meet requirements in Asia, US experts could not identify with the situation in Singapore 
as they were used to R&D operations.  
“Because Singapore site A is a main manufacturing firm, we have huge 
volumes. To them (US - author) it is mainly for R&D. So usually when we 
have some issues, they will not see the problem. Usually IT (from US - 
author) will say: “How come Singapore site A you have that issue?” The 
volume is different, we have a higher volume. There is a difference here, but 
they will not really see our problem. Because sometimes there are some 
system problems, their sites do not have the problem, but our site has the 
problem.” - ST, DiskCo-H-1 
The vice president IT learned from his conversion team there were major problems with the 
first implementation. This initial setup of the ERP system was not stable, meaning that it 
could not process the real volumes common to Asian disk drive plants. Instead of sticking to 
the original schedule, the VP urged his boss not to proceed according to the original schedule. 
Instability at the first plants would infect subsequent implementations.  
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“The initial plan is that next month we convert another plant. So I tell my 
boss no. That will just be a disaster. Because we believe that Singapore site 
A must be stabilized. Anything we do at [Singapore site A] we apply the 
same to rest of the drive plants. If we cannot stabilize here and we continue 
to apply, then every plant will fail. And I cannot afford to fail one plant and 
focus all my resources just to solve all the problems. I cannot afford to 
stretch my resources to solve problems of a few plants happening in the 
same time span. So we adjust that and we had a lot of good reasons to 
convince the boss to adjust. (…) And that is one of my roles, to look at the 
situation and adjust the plan and convince the management that we need to 
adjust the plan. And the people below are the ones who keep enough detail 
and feedback and say: “Hey we cannot make it”. I have to make that call 
and decide either to pull in more resources or adjust the plan.” - CPW, 
DiskCo-A-3 
People realized that the project was drifting as phase progress came to a stop in Singapore. 
During this period, however, rapid progress was made in terms of building expertise. In the 
process, people communicated extensively locally and with US counterparts to learn how to 
deal with the huge volumes. Once they understood, the implementation continued the 
prescribed phases of the master schedule but not at the same pace with a few months of delay. 
The know-how in Singapore enabled acceleration compared to the original schedule. After a 
phase of drifting, DiskCo had regained control of the project at a higher level.  
“We made 3 major adjustments. That means after the [Singapore site A] 
conversion, we were supposed to convert another Malaysian site one month 
later. But after [Singapore site A] conversion the system was not stable, we 
had a lot of problems. And the resources that we have are just good enough 
to solve our [Singapore site A] problems. Since the rest of the Drive plants 
were all depending on whatever modification we have for [Singapore site 
A], and wait for this system to stabilize, we think that we should push up the 
rest for 2 months. And that is a good decision because after 2 months we 
cleared all the issues here. Then when we (team from Singapore site A - 
author) go over there, the conversion only takes 2 days. Because all the 
issues were resolved.” - CPW, DiskCo-A-5  
To conclude, DiskCo knew it run the risk of drifting and it did everything to avoid it. While 
smaller instances of drifting could be handled by increasing pressure on the organization 
(more resources, longer working hours), the company released the pressure in case of serious 
side slipping. This provided the project team with space to drift and acquire knowledge with a 
focus in mind. Once these issues were resolved, the company reconsidered its original 
structure, looking for opportunities to leverage the drifting episode in terms of acceleration, 
knowledge sharing, and increased grip on future implementations.  
Implications for Research 
With the limitations of this study in mind, we can now point at our contribution and 
connections to literature. Our limitations are, first, the focus on projects, not the 
organizational level. Second, the single case study method supports theory building and 
conceptual generalization, but cannot offer statistical generalization obtained with 
quantitative methods (Yin 1994). And third, our focus on packaged software implementation 
implies that we cannot make claims about multi-site implementation of custom-built 
software, or IS development projects.  
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The DiskCo case suggests that drift in multi-site ERP implementations can be contained and 
used beneficially. Initially, the Far East sites eagerly attempted to avoid drifting by such 
practices as promoting learning and using shared documentation. These practices enabled 
recovery from minor glitches during the implementation. Glitches can be defined then as 
situations where existing procedures and knowledge appear inadequate but do not necessitate 
deviation from the original project plan. During these events, the company sticked to its 
original control strategy and simply invested more resources to resolve the problem.  
On a few occasions, however, the project truly started to drift. According to our definition of 
drifting, this means that unexpected circumstances were encountered that showed the 
incompleteness and possible failure of an initial operating modus without the organization 
having yet feasible alternatives. DiskCo responded with three steps.  
• First, the company stopped the overall project to avoid unnecessary resources 
consumption, and continuation of the project without working solutions.  
• Second, the organization developed a dual focus. On one hand, it stayed tuned to the 
overarching goal of achieving the main project objective: implementing the system before 
the Y2K could disrupt the current systems. On the other hand, the organization worked on 
addressing the sources of drifting. This dual attention differs from the control and 
incremental strategy. With the control strategy, an organization remains focused on the 
tight alignment of overarching objectives, plans, and operations. Deviation in the 
operations are top-down suppressed or eliminated. The incremental strategy suggests that 
the overarching objective would shift along with the operational drift.  
Our case study suggests that the third strategy offers a viable alternative. Drifting is not 
necessarily a reason for changing the overarching objective. The organization remains 
focused on the final objective, and makes adjustments necessary for achieving it. 
Similarly, a driver starting to skid on a wet surface divides his attention between the 
overarching goal of not hitting anyone or anything, while performing the specific 
movements necessary to address the skidding car. A control strategy would imply an 
attempt to maintain control using the original routines which do not work under these 
circumstances. An incremental strategy means that the driver becomes so locked up in 
resolving the micro problem that he loses sight of the larger context in which he operates. 
Weick and Roberts (1993) give examples of this phenomenon on aircraft carriers where 
pilots become locked up in aircraft malfunctioning and forget their embeddedness in the 
larger airspace and air control activity system.  
• Third and finally, once the sources of drifting are understood and resolved, the original 
control strategy kicks in though with a twist. Knowledge acquired during the drift 
resolution phase is used for accelerating the project phases to make up for time lost and 
achieve the project objective.  
 
We connect these findings to the wider literature relevant to drifting and adaptation. First, our 
findings lead to reinterpretation of failure cases. In Holmström and Stadler (2001) case, the 
initial failure of the Swedish cash card implementation was caused by the banks ignoring of 
critical comments from the environment. The banks were incapable of or unwilling to stay 
focused on the overarching objective – introducing an advanced payment system – while 
allowing for operational deviations to meet stakeholder expectations. Their rigid control 
strategy estranged them from the societal context, which increased resistance.  
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Second, our findings suggest new insights in the ostensive (idea) – performative (execution) 
adaptation cycle introduced by (Feldman et al. 2003). Minor glitches in the execution of a 
program may lead to variation without changing the original plan and the idea behind a 
routine. Major disruption, however, shifts attention temporarily from program execution 
towards learning. The overall idea remains intact, while the planning may be changed to 
allow for ad hoc learning. This results – in addition to pragmatic problem solving – in new 
ostensive insights.  
Finally, the case study contributes to literature on crisis management, where crisis is defined 
as any event or condition that threatens the survival of the organization (D'Aveni et al. 1990). 
Current literature suggests that in case of crisis, successful managers tend to focus on their 
environment, while unsuccessful managers devote their time to internal problems (D'Aveni et 
al. 1990). Our research extends this internal versus external focus debate. We found that 
successful response to drifting implies a dual focus on the organizational objective and 
resolving operational sources of drifting. In the DiskCo case, people – not only managers – 
remained focused on the overall objective, partly because bonuses were tied to intermediate 
milestones and the end result.  
Implications for Practice 
Our study offers pointers for management. Organizations implementing packaged software 
are likely to experience drifting. While the phenomenon might be inevitable to some extent, 
organizational response to drifting seems to explain success or failure. Successful 
organizations define the overarching goal in advance. The definition must be sufficiently 
relevant and abstract that under different conditions it can serve as a beacon. Once translated 
into specific plans and procedures, drifting may occur but does not necessarily lead to loss of 
control. The level of control becomes more abstract as organizations focus on the overall 
objective. Simultaneously, resources must be invested towards accelerating resolution of 
drifting. While challenging, managers should not panic when drifting occurs. They must steer 
clear of rigid enforcement of the original straightjacket (control strategy). They must also not 
let the situation overwhelm them and pull them into an incremental strategy mode. This may 
lead to unnecessary and undesirable adaptation of the overall objectives, resulting in extended 
drifting experience. Drift is more likely to occur and to lead to failure when managers exhibit 
behaviors that support these two dysfunctional directions.  
Drift-resolving managers will display the courage and master the art of keeping sufficient 
distance from the situation to remain calm and focused on the overall goal, while staying 
closely involved to support their organization in its attempt to resolve the drifting. At the end 
of the drifting episode, they can push people to share and apply their lessons learnt in order to 
make up for the lost time. Their focus has always been on accomplishing the overarching 
objective. 
Conclusion 
Drifting is a phenomenon that seems inevitable in IS implementation, particularly in complex 
ERP systems projects. The objective of this conceptual and empirical paper has been twofold. 
The first is to gain a better insight into the origins and nature of drifting. We reviewed recent 
research on IS implementation in general and on ERP systems implementation more 
specifically. The second aim was to show how organizations deal with drifting in a contained 
manner in the sense of regaining control instead of letting projects escalate. Literature 
proposes three strategies to deal with drifting: control, incremental, and drift containment. 
We discussed background and nature of each approach, and continued to focus on the third 
strategy which seemed most promising. We empirically investigated how drift containment 
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could be accomplished in practice in a multi-site ERP implementation project. Our results 
suggest that organizations must first recognize when drifting occurs. Next, they must 
differentiate between a project’s overarching objectives – which remain relatively stable – 
and their operational drifting experiences. While staying focused on the objectives, they 
address the causes of drifting. Finally, lessons learnt during drifting resolution must be shared 
and applied to accelerate materialization of project objectives.  
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